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Abstract
Starting from the stylized fact that the Swiss franc is a safe haven currency, this paper fo-
cuses on the determinants of the Swiss franc during the lower bound regime from Septem-
ber 2011 to January 2015. We describe the Swiss franc as a function of global market risk fun-
damentals and find that the macroeconomic model outlined by Krugman (1991) describes
the EUR/CHF exchange rate well during this particular time. We show that, as predicted by
Krugman’s model, the sole expectation that the Swiss National Bank would prevent the
Swiss franc from appreciating beyond 1.20 to the euro muted the sensitivity of EUR/CHF to
global market risk. An important assumption for the model prediction to hold is that the
central bank’s commitment to the exchange rate target is credible. We thus use EUR/CHF
option prices together with the global market risk fundamental to assess the credibility of
the lower bound. We find that the only true credibility issue was in November 2014. After
November 2014 the Swiss National Bank could convince markets anew from its target-zone
policy and suspend the lower bound unexpectedly a few weeks later.
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1 Introduction
The Swiss franc is a safe haven currency: during the last hundred years, the Swiss franc has
been appreciating whenever markets have been volatile and declining worldwide (see for ex-
ample Baltensperger & Kugler, 2016). Likewise, the franc rapidly gained in value against all
major currencies in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008/2009. In the wake of
the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, low interest rates and a massive expansion of
the Swiss monetary base could not halt the unchecked appreciation of the Swiss franc against
all major currencies. As the strength of the Swiss franc started to severely challenge the Swiss
economy, on 6 September 2011, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) took action and declared to
enforce a minimum exchange rate of 1.20 Swiss francs per one euro for an indefinite period of
time. Markets were surprised by this sudden policy change, but probably even more so when
the SNB abruptly declared the end of this lower bound regime on 15 January 2015.
Taking the safe haven property of the Swiss franc as a given, this paper follows a macroeco-
nomic approach and describes the Swiss franc as a function of fundamentals that mirror global
market sentiment, such as for example the VIX.1 In particular, this paper focuses on the de-
terminants of the Swiss franc during the lower bound regime over September 2011 to January
2015. We find that the Krugman (1991) model for the behavior of exchange rates within target
zones describes the Swiss franc/euro exchange rate well during this particular time. In Krug-
man’s model, the market’s expectation that a central bank will intervene once its exchange rate
is about to surpass the announced bounds is sufficient to stabilize exchange rates everywhere.
Accordingly, we find that no actual Swiss National Bank interventions were needed to shield
the Swiss franc from worldwide market turbulences, with two exceptions, one during spring
2012, and a second one during fall 2014. As Krugman’s (1991) model predicts, the sensitivity
of the Swiss franc to its global risk fundamentals — the Swiss franc’s safe haven property —
declined as the franc approached the EUR/CHF = 1.20 lower bound. Further, we contrast this
result to the behavior of the Swiss franc during periods characterized by either a freely floating
exchange rate, or by substantial Swiss National Bank interventions independent of an explicitly
communicated exchange rate target.
1Throughout this paper, VIX denotes the CBOE Volatility Index which is derived from the traded option contracts
on the S&P500 index.
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In this paper, we show that Krugman’s (1991) simple, though elegant model can illustrate how
powerful the SNB’s monetary policy experiment has been. This result is remarkable since many
empirical research on exchange rate target zones have rather rejected version of Krugman’s
(1991) approach. The most crucial model assumption is that the central bank’s commitment to
the exchange rate target is credible. Applied to the Swiss-franc-lower-bound-regime, the model
requires that markets put no probability on exchange rate realizations below EUR/CHF = 1.20. The
second part of this paper qualifies our results through the lens of this strong prerequisite. We
crystallize a Swiss-franc specific mistrust-factor from EUR/CHF currency option prices and from
global option prices – from the VIX in particular – and conclude that the Swiss National Bank’s
credibility with respect to the lower bound regime has severely been put into question only
over November 2014. We think that the strong appreciation pressure on the Swiss franc over
spring 2012 was rather related to fear of a break-up of the Eurozone which, obviously, would
have ended the Swiss franc lower bound regime, than to mistrust in the SNB’s lower-bound
commitment. We assert that the SNB suspended the “Swiss franc’s lower-bound honeymoon”
a few weeks after true mistrust towards the SNB’s exchange rate policy announcement had
arisen for the first time.
The next section introduces the global market risk state variable VIX as a macroeconomic fun-
damental for EUR/CHF. It unveils that the explanatory power of this VIX-global-market-risk-
fundamental for the Swiss franc varies over episodes characterized by different Swiss National
Bank monetary policy regimes. Section (3) presents the Krugman (1991) exchange-rate-target-
zone model and shows that it describes the behavior of EUR/CHF well during the Swiss franc
lower bound episode. Krugman’s (1991) macroeconomic model describes exchange rates as a
function of macroeconomic fundamentals, K. Whenever we refer to the VIX in its particular role
as such an exchange rate fundamental, K, we refer to it as KVIX. Section (4) uses currency option
prices to assess the credibility of the SNB’s lower-bound commitment. This is not only a crucial
condition in the Krugman model, but also interesting per se. Section (5) relates the analysis in
this paper to the recent literature, and Section (6) concludes.
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2 Episodes of different Swiss franc regimes
To begin with, Figure (1) plots the Swiss franc/euro spot exchange rate together with the VIX,
and with the Swiss National Bank’s foreign currency reserves, over 2008 to 2016. Vertical lines
separate five episodes of different Swiss franc exchange rate policy regimes. These episodes are
identified by the SNB’s officially announced policy stance in the Quarterly Bulletins,2 together
with the evolution of the central bank’s foreign currency reserves.3 Interestingly, these episodes
also differ by the volatility of EUR/CHF conditional on the VIX- volatility of global markets. This
observation forms the starting point of our analysis.
First, we identify two “free-float-periods” the first of which stops in April 2009, and the second
reaches from June 2010 to September 2011. Over these episodes, the SNB had not communi-
cated any exchange rate target and its foreign currency reserves remained broadly unchanged.
When floating freely, the Swiss franc is volatile and co-moves strongly with the VIX: global
market sentiment, as indicated by this index, importantly determines the value of the Swiss
franc. This stands in sharp contrast to the franc’s behavior during two “intervention-periods”:
between April 2009 and June 2010, and since January 2015, the SNB announced to prevent the
Swiss franc from appreciating,4 and increasing foreign currency reserves in its balance sheet
indicate that it traded accordingly — with limited success over spring 2010 however. During
these intervention-periods, the Swiss franc’s volatility is muted. Note that these intervention-
periods are not shaped by an explicitly communicated exchange rate target, which importantly
distinguishes them from the unique “lower-bound-period” over September 2011 to January
2015. As regards the volatility of the exchange rate, it is only during the lower-bound regime
that it is level-dependent: it is higher whenever EUR/CHF notes further above the lower bound
of 1.20. This is exciting, because it corresponds exactly to what Krugman’s (1991) model will
predict.
Table (1) confirms the above conclusions concerning the different exchange rate regimes. The
2https://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/pub/oecpub/id/pub_oecpub_quartbul
3https://data.snb.ch/en
4After the franc had appreciated sharply against the euro in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008,
the SNB announced to prevented the Swiss franc from appreciating further against the euro – see the SNB’s quar-
terly assessments of March, June, September, and December 2009, and of March 2010. Since the suspension of
the Swiss franc lower bound, the SNB communicates to take account of the exchange rate situation, and therefore re-
main active in the foreign exchange market, as necessary: see the SNB’s quarterly assessments over 2015 and 2016,
https://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/pub/oecpub/id/pub_oecpub_quartbul.
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table shows least square estimates from regressing percentage changes of EUR/CHF on percent-
age changes of the VIX. As expected, changes in the VIX are negatively correlated with changes
in the Swiss franc’s price during the free-float periods. Higher global market risk implies a
higher value of the Swiss franc. During the intervention-periods in contrast, VIX cannot explain
EUR/CHF. Last, the VIX does explain EUR/CHF during the lower-bound-period, but coefficient es-
timates and R2-measures are lower than during the free-float episodes. This conforms with the
predictions of Krugman’s 1991 model.
Important explanatory power of global risk factors for the Swiss franc, such as the VIX, is
also documented in Griesse & Nitschka (2013), who further document increasing sensitivity
of the Swiss franc to global risk in times of high uncertainty. Similarly, Ranaldo & Soder-
lind (2010) find that the Swiss franc appreciates systematically against the euro when global
equity markets, bond markets, and currency markets signal difficult economic conditions.
Kugler & Weder di Mauro (2005) document that the Swiss franc pays high returns if unex-
pected events that increase world-wide political uncertainty happen. Taking an asset pricing
approach, Verdelhan (2011) and Hoffmann & Suter (2010) construct a global risk factor from
a large cross-section of currency returns and find that this factor has important explanatory
power for excess returns of the Swiss franc. All this evidence challenges the conclusion put
forward by Meese & Rogoff (1983) whereby exchange rates basically are unpredictable,5 and
it supports the macroeconomic explanation of EUR/CHF we suggest in this paper within Paul
Krugman’s (1991) model.
5There exists a growing literature that documents that currency returns are predictable from economic fun-
damentals. Lustig & Verdelhan (2007), Burnside (2011) and Lustig & Verdelhan (2011) discuss the association of
currency returns with consumption growth. Menkhoff et al. (2013) show that currency returns are predictable
conditional on several standard macroeconomic fundamentals such as interest rate differentials, real GDP growth,
real money growth, and real exchange rates, Hoffmann & Suter (2013) show that the cross-section of consumption
growth rates predicts currency portfolio returns, and Jorda & Taylor (2009) find that a fundamental equilibrium ex-
change rate explains carry trade returns. Burnside et al. (2011b), Burnside et al. (2009), Burnside et al. (2011a), and
Burnside et al. (2011c) focus on explanations of the carry trade such as investor overconfidence and peso problems.
Lustig et al. (2011) show that currency portfolios that covary more heavily with global carry trade returns earn
higher excess returns on average, thus compensating investors for large losses during times of global market tur-
moil. Menkhoff et al. (2012) find that innovations in exchange rate volatility have explanatory power for currency
portfolio returns.
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3 A model for exchange rates within a target zone
Paul Krugman’s (1991) elegant model became the starting point for much research on the eco-
nomics of exchange rate target zones which was of high interest during the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). In this system, introduced
in 1979, member countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) agreed to peg their
bilateral exchange rates within fluctuation bands of no more than±2.25 percent around central
parities. However, these exchange rate bands have frequently been realigned, and after specu-
lative attacks have urged the British pound and the Italian lira to leave the system, the German
Reunification eventually triggered the collapse of the system in 1993.
For operating exchange-rate target-zones, Krugman (1991) describes a macroeconomic model
in which the exchange rate is an S-shaped function of fundamentals. This function obtains un-
der two important model assumptions. First, a central bank’s commitment to the target-zone
must be credible. Credible in this context means that markets never doubt the continuation of the
lower bound. Second, central banks must intervene in currency markets only when exchange
rates effectively threaten to touch one of the edges of the band. Probably because these con-
ditions did not hold in reality, empirical tests mostly rejected Krugman’s model. In the ERM,
central bank interventions were frequent also inside the band,6 and realignments of the cur-
rency bands happened on several occasions thus rationalizing doubt on the continuation of
existing currency bands. All around the world, speculative attacks frequently made exchange-
rate target-zones collapse.7
For the Swiss franc, the situation is different. First, the Swiss National Bank has announced
to defend a strong-side bound for its currency. This implies that no speculative attacks are
possible that would urge a sudden realignment or a suspension of the exchange-rate bound,
because a central bank can expand the monetary base of its currency without limits. Because of
this, a strong-side exchange rate commitment is likely to be more credible than any weak-side
6See for example Flood et al. (1991) or the evidence cited by Garber & Svensson (1995).
7Following the German unification which required a tightening of monetary policy in Germany, the European
exchange rate mechanism came into crisis: in September 1992, the lira was devalued and the UK saw itself unable
to halt depreciation pressure on the pound sterling and suspended its participation in the ERM. Until mid-1993,
several currencies within the ERM were devalued. Eventually, after the Banque de France attempted to cut interest
rates to sub-German levels, ERM fluctuation margins were widened from ±2.25 percent to ±15 percent in August
1993. Other prominent examples for dramatical devaluations of currencies within more or less fixed exchange rate
systems include the 1994 economic crisis in Mexico, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Russian ruble crisis in 1998,
or the Argentine economic crisis 1998-2002.
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commitment. Hence, a central bank can be more relaxed to let its currency float very closely
to the edge of the band. Figure (1) suggests that the SNB did so because foreign currency re-
serves never increase when EUR/CHF noted above 1.20. The stability of the Swiss franc exchange
rate target zone solely rests upon the willingness of the SNB to accumulate foreign exchange
reserves in unlimited quantities when necessary, and to stand firm against political pressure to
rise or lower the exchange rate bound. In these respects, the Swiss case is unique — the cred-
ibility condition (as we will argue later in more detail) and the no-interventions-above-the-bound
condition are fulfilled such that Krugman’s (1991) model applies.
3.1 Krugman’s (1991) model
Following Krugman (1991), consider a log-linear model of the exchange rate. Expressing all
variables in natural logarithms, the exchange rate s equals
st = mt − Kt + γEt(dst)dt . (1)
where s is the spot price of foreign exchange and Et(·) denotes expectation conditional on infor-
mation available at time t. Further, there are two fundamentals in the exchange rate equation
(1), the domestic money supply m and a shift term K. Monetary policy is passive; in the case of
the Swiss franc, the central bank is prepared to increase m to prevent s from falling below the
announced minimum level s, but as long as s notes above s, money supply remains unchanged.
The only exogenous source of exchange rate dynamics is the shift term K. In Krugman’s expo-
sition of the model, K represents a velocity shock. As we focus on the Swiss franc in its role as a
safe haven currency, we specify K to be a state variable for global market risk, whereby higher K
indicates tighter markets: higher K implies a lower s which corresponds to a more appreciated
Swiss franc against the euro.
To solve the model, assume that K follows a continuous-time random walk
dKt = µdt + σdWt (2)
where µ is a constant predictable change in K, dW is a standard Wiener process, and σ is a
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constant. This assumption implies that if markets expect no changes in m, that is, if there are
no specific monetary policy rules in place, there will be no predictable changes in s.
If the monetary authority announces to impose a lower limit on s, we show in the Appendix
that the following general solution for the exchange rate function obtains:
s(mt, Kt) = (mt − Kt) + γµ+ B exp(λ(mt − Kt)) (3)
λ > 0 is a parameter and B > 0 is a constant of integration. Figure (2) sketches this function:
given m, s falls in K. Intuitively, since market’s expectation that s will increase once it notes at s
enters the basic exchange rate equation (1), the sensitivity of s on K declines in K. Once persistent
increases in K have nevertheless driven the exchange rate to the lower bound, one has to impose
that s becomes insensitive to K. Otherwise, changes in s conditional on K would be predictable
as the central bank will allow for increases in s only. This would give rise to arbitrage profits.
Assuming central bank credibility and considering this no-arbitrage condition, the “bended”
fundamental exchange rate function (3) results that Figure (2) depicts.
3.2 The Swiss franc’s honeymoon
Figure (3) presents an empirical implementation of the Krugman (1991) exchange rate function
(3) with s = EUR/CHF and the VIX as the exchange rate fundamental KVIX. The scatterplot of Figure
(3) unveils the model-implied negative, non-linear relationship between KVIX and EUR/CHF: the
Swiss franc can be described as a falling, concave function of KVIX. The figure suggests that
the Swiss franc becomes less sensitive to KVIX closely above the bound which is also where it
clusters: in Krugman’s model, exchange rates are expected to move slowly near the edge of the
target zone such that – intuitively – they will appear there often.
Table (2) presents the results from testing the Krugman exchange rate function econometrically.
The table shows least square coefficient estimates {β,γ, δ} and corresponding t-statistics for the
following regression
∆st = α+ β
(
Sˆt∆Kt
)
+ γ∆Kt + δSˆt + et
∆st = α+ β1
(
Sˆt∆Kup,t
)
+ β2
(
Sˆt∆Kdown,t
)
+ γ∆Kt + δSˆt + et
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where ∆st = ln(St)− ln(St−1) are percentage changes in the EUR/CHF spot rate, and Kt = KVIX,t.
The term Sˆt = (St − S) = (St − 1.20) denotes the level of the actual exchange rate above
its lower bound. Eventually, the above regression allows for separate slope coefficients β =
{β1, β2} for upward movements (Kup) and downward movements (Kdown) of the fundamental.
This specification is motivated by Lettau et al. (2013) who show that currency returns covary
more strongly with aggregate market returns conditional on bad market returns than condi-
tional on good market returns. In line with this conclusion, Table (2) shows that the coefficient
estimate for the interaction terms, β, are significantly positive, whereby this relationship is
more distinct during market downturns. The regression analysis confirms that the “loading”
(= βSˆt) of the exchange rate on KVIX is time-varying and increases in the actual exchange rate’s
distance from the lower bound, Sˆt.
Complementary evidence that the sensitivity of the Swiss franc/euro exchange rate increases
in the distance of the spot rate from its lower bound is provided by Figure (4). Applying the
methodology proposed by Elliott & Mueller (2006) and Mueller & Petalas (2010), this Figure
plots a time-varying estimate for the βt coefficient obtained from regressing percentage changes
of the spot rate, ∆st, on ∆KVIX,t.
∆st = α+ βt∆KVIX,t + et. (4)
By the safe-haven property of the Swiss franc, we expect βt < 0, and Krugman’s (1991) model
predicts lower βt if EUR/CHF is higher. This is what we find. The quasi-local-level test (qLL test)
prosed by Elliott & Mueller (2006) indicates strong parameter instability (time-variation) for βt,
and graphical inspection suggests that βt falls in EUR/CHF: the elasticity of the Swiss franc to
KVIX is higher the further away EUR/CHF notes from its lower bound.
To conclude, Krugman’s (1991) model finds support by the behavior of the Swiss franc/euro
exchange rate conditional on a global market risk fundamental: the SNB has sent its currency
into honeymoon where it relaxed under the sunshade of market expectations that provided
protection against crazy fundamentals.
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4 Credibility
While the condition that a central bank does not change the monetary base as its exchange rate
stays inside the band is easily verified and holds for the Swiss franc, the credibility condition
is more difficult to assess. Because this condition is not only crucial in the framework of Krug-
man’s model, but also interesting per se, this section examines the credibility assumption for
the Swiss franc lower bound regime using financial market data.
4.1 forward exchange rates
A “simple test of target zone credibility” has been proposed by Svensson (1990). Svensson
noted that forward exchange rates represent expected appreciation or depreciation of exchange
rates, and they must never lie outside the band in a credible target-zone regime. Otherwise,
arbitrage opportunities would arise.8 Applied to the Swiss case, Figure (5) visualizes that
EUR/CHF forward exchange rates never importantly noted below EUR/CHF = 1.20, in particu-
lar not at levels as low as 1.10 that realized when the SNB ended the lower-bound era. Hence,
in retrospect, Svensson’s (1990) test broadly confirms that markets have taken the SNB’s lower-
bound-commitment for granted. But qualifying this result, Campa & Chang (1996, 1998), or
Malz (1996, 1997a) noted that higher moments of the exchange rate distribution are more infor-
mative about market’s expectations. Currency option prices not only inform about the mean,
but also about the variance, skewness and kurtosis of the expected exchange rate distribution
function. This can inform about the probability which markets assign to the continuation of an
exchange-rate target zone in place.
4.2 over-the-counter (OTC) option price quotes
Prices of different option contracts imply a probability density function for future exchange
rate realizations. The option price quotes that are readily available in over-the-counter markets
8Bertola & Svensson (1993) presented an extension of the Krugman (1991) model in which a state variable in
addition to the exchange rate fundamental K accounts for market’s expected probability and size of a realignment
of the edges of an exchange rate target-zone in operation, and for example Rose & Svensson (1995), Svensson (1993)
or Lindberg et al. (1993) provide empirical implementations for different currency pairs of the ERM. Thereby, their
assessment of credibility relies on the uncovered interest rate parity condition by which interest rate differentials or
forward discounts should be unbiased predictors of future exchange rates.
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are the at-the-money implied volatility price, the risk-reversal price, and the strangle price.
These are prices of particular option portfolios which are described in the Appendix. It is con-
venient to focus on these three prices, because they summarize the distribution of the exchange
rate function which they imply. In particular, the at-the-money implied volatility indicates the
overall level, the risk-reversal indicates the skewness, and the strangle volatility price indicates
the kurtosis of the option-prices implied exchange rate distribution. Note that this distribution
is a risk-neutral distribution, which means that it puts more weight on exchange rate values
which markets fear.9 But even if — or rather because — this option-implied exchange rate
distribution function does not mirror “true” expectations, but “feared” expectations, it impor-
tantly informs about market sentiment.
Figure (6) shows time series of the EUR/CHF at-the-money implied volatility (ATM), the 25-delta
risk-reversal (RR), and of the 25-delta strangle (STR) over the lower-bound regime.10 Negative
risk-reversal prices indicate appreciation pressure on the Swiss franc against the euro, and high
strangle prices indicate that markets put high probability on a large jump of the exchange rate
in either direction.
For the days during spring 2012 when EUR/CHF was sticky at 1.20, the 25-delta RR-prices allow
for a direct assessment of the perceived stability of the Swiss franc minimum exchange rate.
During these days, this RR prices would have been zero or positive if all market participants
would have expected that one euro will always be exchangeable for 1.20 Swiss francs in the
spot market. Alas, Figure (6) unveils that this did not hold true. In addition, high STR prices
indicate that some market participants indeed expected a large move of EUR/CHF. When the
banking crisis and the sovereign debt crisis hit Europe unprepared in spring 2012, RR-prices
unveil that even the SNB’s market interventions could not halt appreciation pressure on the
franc beyond 1.20 to the euro. However, it is not clear whether this appreciation pressure
has primarily been driven by doubt of whether the SNB was truly “prepared to buy foreign
currencies in unlimited quantities”,11 or whether increasing global risk aversion and fear of a
9As an example, consider a EUR/CHF call option with a relatively high exercise price. A long position in such a
contract insures against a loss from a Swiss franc appreciation. If markets fear such an appreciation, demand for
this option contract will be high which increases its price. In that case, the risk-neutral probability for a Swiss franc
appreciation will turn out to be higher than the probability that traders effectively assign to it.
10The option delta indicates how far an option is in-the-money, or out-of-the money. See the Appendix for further
explanation.
11SNB Quarterly Bulletin of March 2012
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break-up of the Eurozone rather explain it. Support for this latter interpretation is given by the
fact that it was actions taken by the European Central Bank that eased appreciation pressure
on the franc, and not policy steps undertaken by the SNB. Following Draghi’s “whatever-it-
takes” statement at the end of July 201212 and the launch of the Outright Monetary Transaction
(OMT) program13 on 6 September 2012, prospects for the euro improved and EUR/CHF RR-prices
increased.
The EUR/CHF spot exchange rate and RR-prices fell again over November 2014. While the above
narrative suggests that appreciation pressure on the franc during 2012 sourced in demand for
insurance that Swiss francs could provide when the future of the euro was uncertain, this time,
appreciation pressure is likely more related to markets expecting a soon end of the lower-bound
policy. This was triggered by rumors that the ECB was considering large-scale open market
transactions, which inevitably induces appreciation pressure on the franc vis-à-vis the euro.14
But in December, the SNB started to target negative LIBOR rates and could convince markets
again that it will always defend EUR/CHF = 1.20.15 Having regained credibility, the SNB’s
suspension of the lower bound one month later came as a surprise — option prices, together
with the sharp fall of EUR/CHF on 15 January 2015, tell that markets didn’t anticipate this to
happen.
4.3 appreciation pressure on the franc at 1.20: “global risk aversion” vs “lack of
credibility”?
While risk-reversal prices and strangle prices with constant delta indicate appreciation pressure
and uncertainty for EUR/CHF independent of the actual level of the exchange rate, the trajectory
of the price of EUR/CHF option contracts with a constant strike of K = 1.20 can inform about
appreciation expectations of the franc beyond 1.20 to the euro also when EUR/CHF noted above
12In July 2012, Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, unambiguously stated that the ECB will
be “...ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”. Follow for example this link: http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=Pq1V0aPEO3c. At the beginning of September 2012, the publication details for the Outright Mon-
etary Transaction (OMT) program further calmed markets, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/
html/pr120906_1.en.html.
13 The Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program allows the ECB to buy government-issued bonds on
secondary markets to provide liquidity to countries that face problems selling their debt. For details, follow
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html
14see for example this Reuters news: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ecb-qe-idUKKCN0IT0KX20141109
15See the SNB Quarterly Bulletin of 11 December 2014, https://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/pub/oecpub/id/pub_oecpub_quartbul
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1.20. Option prices for given strike prices are not quoted in the market, but the Appendix
shows how to obtain them from ATM, RR, and STR prices with constand delta.
Consider the price of an European EUR/CHF put options that entitles its holder to sell one euro
for K = 1.20 Swiss francs in τ =one month time:16
P(K, τ) =
1
1+ iτ
ˆ K
0
(K− Sτ(κτ)) f (Sτ)dSτ (5)
In the following, the price of this put contract is denoted by P(1.20). This option contract is in-the-
money (has a positive price) only if E(Sτ) < K, that is, if E(EUR/CHFτ) < 1.20. Strictly speaking,
in a credible lower-bound exchange rate regime, such a put option contract must never have
a positive price. But the panel in the middle of Figure (7) unveils that P(1.20) has been high at
various instances. Figure (9) in the Appendix suggests that the probability for Sτ < 1.20 has
repeatedly been as high as 30%− 40%, and even positive for Sτ < 1.10 over spring 2012. But
in the above section, we have argued that the then observed high prices for put contracts with
strikes below EUR/CHF = 1.20 likely resulted from fear of the euro falling apart. In contrast, we
argue that over November 2014, the SNB was indeed confronted with a credibility problem.
The following paragraphs elaborate on this presumption.
This paper describes the Swiss franc as a safe haven currency, that is, as a function of global
risk fundamentals such as the VIX. Credibility of the lower bound implies that the sensitivity
of the franc to its global risk fundamentals is zero at the bound and increases in the distance
of the spot rate from the bound: the announcement to always defend EUR/CHF = 1.20 has
muted the safe haven property of the Swiss franc. This obtains without any foreign exchange
market transactions by the SNB, as long as EUR/CHF notes above 1.20. Over spring 2012 and
fall 2014 in contrast, EUR/CHF was sticky at 1.20, and it did not fall further because the SNB
enforced it. By trading to stabilize EUR/CHF at 1.20, the SNB completely suspended the safe
haven behavior of the Swiss franc spot exchange rate because it let not market forces determine
its price. But in contrast to the spot exchange rate, this central bank trading could not suspend
16Hanke et al. (2016) summarize that because short-term interest rates on the Swiss franc have been close to zero
and consistently below euro interest rates, an American EUR/CHF put option should never be exercised early, which
makes its price equal to that of a European put option (see Hanke et al. (2016) on page 10, or the argumentation in
Hanke et al. (2015)).
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the safe haven characteristics of EUR/CHF option prices, as Figure (7) unveils. The middle and
the lower plot of this figure show that P(1.20) strongly co-moves with VIX, also when EUR/CHF
noted at the bound. This safe haven behavior of EUR/CHF option prices, which apparently is not
(completely) suspended by the Swiss franc lower bound, allows to shed light on whether global,
or Swiss franc specific factors lie at the source of Swiss franc appreciation pressure. Whenever
P(1.20) and VIX-global-risk-aversion spike at the same time, appreciation pressure on the Swiss
franc is likely driven by global market risk and not by Swiss franc specific issues such as “SNB
credibility”. Confirming the conclusion derived from RR prices, P(1.20) sharply increased absent
a corresponding peak in VIX only over fall 2014. We conclude that this identifies the single
severe instance of low SNB credibility.
4.3.1 identifying credibility independent of global risk aversion
We have argued that P(1.20) can be driven by both, global risk aversion and expectation of a soon
end of the Swiss franc lower bound regime. The upper plot of Figure (7) attempts to distinguish
these two sources of appreciation pressure on the Swiss franc. The figure presents the scores
of the two principal components constructed from the global risk exchange rate fundamental
KVIX = VIX, and P(1.20). While building principal components is a purely technical method to
separate orthogonal factors from correlated variables, we can assign both factors an obvious
interpretation here. The first principal component loads positively on both, VIX and P(1.20), and
it explains three quarters of the total variance. Clearly, this factor mirrors broad global market
sentiment. The trajectory of the second factor however suggests an interpretation in terms of
credibility or mistrust. By construction, and by the obvious interpretation of the first principal
component, this factor is unrelated to overall market risk. In more detail, this factor is high over
2012, but a clear single spike is also visible in fall 2014. To conclude, this factor analysis adds
evidence that doubt in the continuation of the lower bound regime, that sourced in a potential
decision of the SNB in the first place (and not in a break-up of the Eurozone for example), only
arose during November 2014.
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4.3.2 macroeconomic explanation of EUR/CHF option prices
In the Krugman (1991) model, appreciation pressure on the franc beyond 1.20 to the euro never
occurs. This framework predicts that the safe haven property of the Swiss franc — its sys-
tematic co-movement with variables that mirror global market tension — gradually vanishes
as the franc approaches the lower bound. But evidence presented above suggests that the
model-conform behavior of EUR/CHF was on hold during spring 2012 and November 2014, as
the Swiss franc was insensitive to KVIX only because the SNB enforced it, and not because of
model-conform expectations. In particular, EUR/CHF option prices (P(1.20)) display a safe haven
behavior over the spring 2012 episode. But during the other months of the lower bound regime,
P(1.20) should be a non-linear function of KVIX too, because it is monotone in the value of the un-
derlying EUR/CHF exchange rate. This finds support in Figure (8) that plots the negative of P(1.20)
against VIX: most observations align on a Krugman (1991) model type “bended honeymoon
curve” in the P(1.20) and KVIX space. The spring 2012 interruption of the Swiss franc’s honey-
moon is clearly visible by the observations marked as red dots which lie as outliers “far below
the bended curve”. The same is observed for the November 2014 episode (green circles). Both
episodes are characterized by doubt about the continuation of the lower bound, which — as we
argue — is due to high global market risk in the first case, and to effective doubt on the SNB’s
readiness to continue the lower bound regime in the second case. Interestingly, the observa-
tions of P(1.20) and VIX for the final days of the lower bound regime are perfectly in line with
the predictions of Krugman’s model. Table (3) shows least square coefficient estimates from
regressing percentage changes of P(1.20) on percentage changes of KVIX, interacted with the level
of EUR/CHF above the lower bound. As for the EUR/CHF spot rate, the results confirm that the
safe haven behavior of P(1.20) declines as the spot rate approaches the lower bound. The further
above the lower bound the Swiss franc notes, the more does P(1.20) increase if global risk, VIX,
increases.
5 related literature
The present paper continues our earlier working-paper version available as Studer-Suter &
Janssen (2014); to the best of our knowledge, we were the first to relate to Paul Krugman’s
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(1991) ideas to describe the Swiss franc lower bound episode. But meanwhile, our approach
and our results are closely related to the findings of a series of recent papers: in a nutshell, the
literature concludes that EUR/CHF tends to be distributed as Krugman’s (1991) model predicts
(Hertrich, 2016b), and credibility of the SNB’s regime has been low over the initial months of
the lower-bound regime, but increased until summer 2014, when it started to decline again. All
studies agree that EUR/CHF would have been much lower than 1.20 during the 2012 outbreak
of the European sovereign debt crisis, but only two papers (Hertrich, 2016a and Hertrich &
Zimmermann, 2015) conclude that the SNB’s credibility was weak during that time. Eventually,
the literature concludes that the SNB ended the lower-bound regime at a point in time when
markets’ doubt was high.
A log-linear model for the exchange rate forms the starting point of most studies on exchange
rate target zones, which is also common in finance. But in this framework, the only recent
publication that takes our way and uses macroeconomic fundamentals to explain EUR/CHF is
Hui et al. (2016): these authors find that the drift coefficient in the equation for the fundamental
— that corresponds to µ in equation (2) of this paper — increases in foreign exchange reserves
which pushes EUR/CHF away from the strong-side limit. Time-variation in µ can be interpreted
as variability in credibility.
A series of papers decomposes the log-linear process for the exchange rate into a “fundamen-
tal” or “latent” exchange rate, that is, the exchange rate that would have prevailed in absence
of the lower bound, plus a “guarantee”17 which is the value of the SNB’s commitment to pre-
vent the franc from appreciating beyond 1.20 to the euro. Jermann (2016) describes a model
in which this guarantee is determined by the expected continuation probability of the lower-
bound regime at a given horizon, and he applies his model to price currency options condi-
tional on the model-implied exchange rate process. Hanke et al. (2015) and Hanke et al. (2016)
view the SNB’s guarantee as a put option to sell euros for 1.20 Swiss francs, and in addition to a
latent process for the exchange rate, they derive measures for the market’s expected remaining
lifetime of the lower-bound regime: they find that credibility increased between summer 2012
and summer 2014, but then started to fall again which suggests that markets had anticipated the
end of the lower-bound era. Hertrich (2016a) proposes to model EUR/CHF as a reflected geomet-
17we like this term which is borrowed from Hanke et al. (2016)
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ric Brownian motion, as in Veestraeten (2013). His estimate of the process for the latent EUR/CHF
exchange rate resembles those of the contributions cited above, but he interprets the difference
between the latent (implied by their option pricing model) and the observed exchange rate as
a measure of the costs the SNB had to bear to sustain the lower bound regime. This suggests to
conclude that credibility has been low during the 2012 outbreak of the European crisis, which
stands in contrast to the interpretations of the other papers cited above.
Hertrich (2016b) adapts the target-zone model by Chen and Giovannini (1992) to allow for
estimates of the unconditional distribution of EUR/CHF in its one-sided target-zone. He finds
that EUR/CHF is asymmetric and right-skewed which corresponds to what the Krugman (1991)
model predicts, and which reaffirms that the SNB intervened in currency markets only at the
lower bound, and not above it. The second crucial assumption of Krugman’s (1991) model,
which is the credibility assumption, is the main focus of Hertrich & Zimmermann (2015). These
authors specify a currency option pricing model which applies to exchange rates in one-sided
target zones; in this model, the exchange rate follows a Brownian motion as in the standard
Garman & Kohlhagen (1983) model, which our qualitative results are based on, but the process
has a reflecting barrier in addition. If correctly specified, this model allows for quantitative
estimates of option-implied probabilities for future EUR/CHF rates below the bound. While the
evolution of credibility corresponds to the finding of other papers — low at the beginning,
potentially low during spring 2012, and falling since summer 2014 — these authors conclude
that the SNB’s policy stance has never been credible: they state that in a credible lower-bound
regime, EUR/CHF put option prices must not trade at any positive price. Our paper responds to
this by arguing that much of the appreciation pressure on the Swiss franc was rather not related
to speculation on a suspension of the lower bound, but related to safe haven demand during
times of high global market uncertainty. This is the strength of the macroeconomic approach to
the exchange rate — it allows for interpretations.
The macroeconomic approach of this paper starts from the notion of the Swiss franc as a safe
haven currency, and it documents high explanatory power of the VIX for EUR/CHF, which is a
common measure of global market sentiment.
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6 Conclusion
Starting from the stylized fact that the Swiss franc is a safe haven currency, this paper retrieves
the macroeconomic model outlined by Krugman (1991) to describe the EUR/CHF exchange rate
as a function of global market risk fundamentals, which is the VIX in particular. During most
of the Swiss franc lower bound regime, that was in operation between September 2011 and
January 2015, EUR/CHF behaved conforming with the predictions of Krugman’s model: the sole
expectation that the Swiss National Bank will prevent the Swiss franc from appreciating be-
yond 1.20 to the euro has muted the sensitivity of EUR/CHF to global market risk. The Swiss
franc was in honeymoon. In the model, this obtains because the central bank is assumed to
be credible. The second part of this paper assesses this crucial assumption. Analyzing the
co-movement of EUR/CHF option prices and global market risk, we conclude that though mar-
kets doubted the continuation of the existing EUR/CHF exchange rate policy when the European
sovereign debt crisis put the continuation of the euro into question during spring 2012, SNB
credibility was a true issue only in November 2014. Alas, after markets had doubted the SNB’s
willingness to continue the lower bound regime for the first time, the Swiss central bank could
convince markets anew from its target-zone policy in December 2014. A few weeks later, the
SNB unexpectedly suspended the lower bound. To conclude, this paper supports Krugman’s
(1991) model for EUR/CHF during the Swiss franc lower bound episode. This is remarkable since
a large literature rather rejected versions of this model. But here, this simple, though elegant
approach can explain how the Swiss franc’s value was determined by its global risk fundamen-
tals inside the recent target-zone.
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Figure 1: EUR/CHF, VIX, SNB foreign currency reserve assets
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The blue graph (left axis) shows the Swiss franc/euro spot exchange rate expressed in numbers of Swiss
francs per one euro, and the black graph (right axis) shows the S&P 500 options implied volatility index
VIX. The red graph (right axis) indicates the Swiss National Bank’s foreign currency reserve assets mea-
sured in 10 Mia of Swiss francs. Based on the SNB’s communicated policy stance and on the evolvement
of its foreign currency reserves, the figure distinguishes five different monetary policy regimes which
are characterized by the volatility of the EUR/CHF exchange rate, given the volatility of global markets as
measured by the VIX index. Exchange rate observations and the VIX index are daily, SNB reserve holdings
are reported monthly.
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Figure 2: Sketch of the Krugman (1991) exchange rate function
s=m-κ
m-κ
s
s=s(m,κ,s)
s=EUR/CHF
This figure sketches the Krugman (1991) functional relationship of the spot exchange rate s and currency market
fundamentals κ, m applied to the one-sided target zone regime of the sort that the Swiss National Bank enforced
for the Swiss franc against the euro between September 2011 and January 2015. The existence of the lower bound
s implies a lower bound for the fundamental (m− κ), where m is the monetary base and κ are other currency
market fundamentals reflecting foreign exchange supply and demand. As s approaches the lower bound, it becomes
insensitive to changes in the fundamentals.
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Figure 3: EUR/CHF, a function of KVIX
S&P 500 VIX index
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The figure plots each observation of the Swiss franc/euro exchange rate against the same day’s value of
the S&P 500 options implied volatility index VIX. The data is at daily frequency and includes all days
that were trading days in Switzerland and the US, and for which observations of the VIX index are
available.
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Figure 4: Time-varying sensitivity (β) of EUR/CHF on KVIX
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Applying the method proposed by Elliott & Mueller (2006) and Mueller & Petalas (2010), the black line (left axis)
shows time-varying estimates of the βt- coefficient of the following regression equation
∆st = α+ βtKt + et
where ∆st denote percentage changes in the EUR/CHF spot exchange rate, α denotes a constant and Kt = ln(VIXt)−
ln(VIXt−1) is the exchange rate fundamental. The thin, dotted lines depict 95% confidence intervals for the βt-
estimates. The blue line (right axis) shows the distance of EUR/CHFt from the lower bound of 1.20. The data is at
daily frequency and includes all days that were trading days in Switzerland as well as in the US, and for which the
VIX is available.
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Figure 5: EUR/CHF outright forward exchange rates
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The figure shows EUR/CHF forward outright exchange rates for 1 month, 3 months, and 12 months
maturity. The data is daily and encompasses all days that were trading days in the US and Switzerland
between mid September 2011 and mid January 2015.
Figure 6: OTC EUR/CHF option price quotes
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The figure shows time-series plots of the volatility price of three different EUR/CHF option contracts. A
description of these contracts is given in the Appendix. All option contracts have a maturity of one
month, the data is at daily frequency and encompasses all days that were trading days in Switzerland
and the US.
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Figure 7: A factor for global risk and a credibility-factor
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The upper figure plots the scores of the two principal components of the a) S&P 500 options implied volatility index VIX and of b) the price for an EUR/CHF put option with a
strike price of 1.20 and a time-to-maturity of one month, denoted P(1.20) in this paper. Principal components are constructed from the correlation matrix of the two variables.
The put option price is obtained by interpolating the volatility smile, the Appendix describes further details. The blue graph shows the score of the first principal component
which explains 85% of the variance in the data, and the red graph depicts the score of the second principal component (both left axis). The black, dotted graph indicates the
Swiss National Bank’s currency reserve assets in CHF millions (right axis). The middle plot shows the two variables the principal componends are derived from, the VIX and
P(1.20). The plot at the bottom shows the score of the second principal component again together with EUR/CHF.
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Figure 8: P(1.20)against its global risk fundamental KVIX
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The figure plots ths S&P 500 options implied volatility index VIX against the negative of the price of an
EUR/CHF put option with a strike of 1.20 and one month time to maturity, denoted by P(1.20) in this paper.
Put prices are obtained from the interpolated risk-neutral density function for the Swiss franc prices of
one euro as suggested by Malz (1997b), details are described in the Appendix. The purple line displays
the best fitting quadric polynomial with y = P(1.20) and x = VIX. The data is at daily frequency and
includes all days that were trading days in Switzerland and the US.
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Table 1: EUR/CHF explained by VIX-measured global market risk
JAN 2008 - MAR 2009 APR 2009 - MAY 2010 JUN 2010-AUG 2011 SEPT 2011 - JAN 2015 JAN 2015 -JUL 2016
∆VIX −0.0429∗ −0.0072 −0.0488∗ −0.0072∗ −0.0057
(−10.6546) (−1.7326) (−7.2298) (−6.0061) (−1.7347)
CONST −0.0000 −0.0002 −0.0005 0.0000 0.0002
(−0.0517) (−1.4239) (−1.0799) (0.1391) (1.1680)
R2 0.30 0.03 0.19 0.06 0.01
NOBS 302 279 304 814 380
The table reports coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics from regressing percentage changes in EUR/CHF
on percentage changes in the VIX. T-statistics are calculated from a HAC-consisten covariance matrix according to
Newey & West (1987) and Newey & West (1994). Generally speaking, an increasing VIX indicates “bad days”. The
Swiss franc is a safe haven currency because it systematically appreciates against the euro (and other currencies)
whenever VIX increases. The data is at daily frequency and covers all days that were trading days in the US and
Switzerland, and for which the VIX is available (some few dates are missing). The complete sample spans the period
from 3 January 2008 to 29 July 2016.
Table 2: EUR/CHF as a function of KVIX during the lower bound regime (SEPT 2011 - JAN 2015)
(∆VIX : ∆VIX > 0)× Sˆ −0.4708∗ (∆VIX)× Sˆ −0.3816∗
(−4.6191) (−4.0971)
(∆VIX : ∆VIX < 0)× Sˆ −0.1984
(−1.3620)
∆VIX −0.0009 −0.0008
(−0.7610) (−0.6559)
Sˆ −0.0094 −0.0149∗
(−1.3958) (−2.6345)
CONST 0.0003∗ 0.0003∗
(3.2080) (3.0755)
R2 0.09 0.09
NOBS 814 814
The table reports coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics from regressing percentage changes
in EUR/CHF on percentage changes of the S&P 500 options implied volatility index VIX. T-statistics are
calculated from a HAC-consisten covariance matrix according to Newey & West (1987) and Newey &
West (1994). Sˆ = S− 1.20 denotes the deviation of EUR/CHF from the lower bound. The data is at daily
frequency and covers all days that were trading days in the US and Switzerland, and for which data for
the VIX is available (some few days are missing). The data covers the period from 6 September 2011 to
14 January 2015.
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Table 3: P(1.20) as a function of KVIX
dependent variable: ∆P(1.20)
∆VIX× Sˆ ∆VIX Sˆ ∆s CONST R2 NOBS
88.3188∗ −0.3816 6.1467∗ −121.9785∗ −0.0167 0.33 814
(3.5119) (−1.4336) (4.2790) (−6.4099) (−0.8877)
1.0452∗ 6.4437∗ −127.7677∗ −0.0204 0.31 814
(3.8589) (4.3005) (−6.4993) (−1.0428
The table shows least square coefficient estimates from regressing percentage changes of P(1.20), which
denotes the price of a EUR/CHF put option contract with a strike of 1.20 and a time-to-maturity of 1 month,
on percentage changes in the VIX. In the model presented in the first two rows (coefficient estimates and
t-statistics below), changes in VIX are also interacted with the distance of EUR/CHF from the lower bound,
Sˆ = EUR/CHF − 1.20. The put prices are obtained by interpolating the volatility smile as suggested
by Malz (1997b), details are described in the Appendix. T-statistics for the least squares estimates are
calculated from a HAC-consisten covariance matrix according to Newey & West (1987) and Newey &
West (1994). The data is at daily frequency and covers all days that were trading days in the US and
Switzerland, and for which data for the VIX is available (some few days are missing). The data covers
the period from 6 September 2011 to 14 January 2015.
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A The Krugman (1991) model
Krugman (1991) considers a log-linear model of the exchange rate. Expressing all variables in
natural logarithms, the exchange rate s equals
st = mt + νt + γ
Et(dst)
dt
(6)
where s is the spot price of foreign exchange and Et(·) denotes expectation conditional on infor-
mation available at time t. Further, there are two fundamentals in the exchange rate equation
(6), the domestic money supply m and a shift term ν. Monetary policy is passive; in the case of
the Swiss franc, the central bank is prepared to increase m to prevent s from falling below the
announced minimum level s, but as long as s notes above s, money supply remains unchanged.
The only exogenous source of exchange rate dynamics is the shift term ν. In Krugman’s ex-
position of the model, ν represents a velocity shock, but other interpretations of ν allow for
alternative models for the exchange rate. As we focus on the Swiss franc in its role as a safe
haven currency, we chose variables that mirror global market sentiment as the exchange rate
fundamentals. In particular, we set ν = −K, where a high K indicates increased market risk.
This leads to the following equation for the exchange rate
st = mt − Kt + γEt(dst)dt . (7)
Higher market risk K now implies a lower s which corresponds to a more appreciated Swiss
franc against the euro in our case. To solve the model, assume that K follows a continuous-time
random walk
dKt = µdt + σdWt (8)
where µ is a constant predictable change in K, dW is a standard Wiener process, and σ is a
constant. This assumption implies that if markets expect no changes in m, that is, if there are
no specific monetary policy rules in place, there will be no predictable changes in s. Using Itô’s
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lemma and equation (7), depreciation during such a free float can be written as
1
dt
Et(dst) = s′(mt − Kt)µ+ s′′(mt − Kt)12σ
2.
This leads to the following functional equation for the exchange rate:
s(mt, Kt) = (mt − Kt) + γs′(mt − Kt)µ+ γs′′(mt − Kt)12σ
2. (9)
The general solution to (9) is
s(mt, Kt) = (mt − Kt) + γµ+ A exp(λ1(mt − Kt)) + B exp(λ2(mt − Kt)) (10)
where λ1 > 0 and λ2 < 0.18 A and B are constants of integration. If the exchange rate is allowed
to float freely, s would simply equal the fundamental (m− K) and thus follow a random walk
process, and we may set A = B = 0.
However, if the central bank announces to impose a lower limit s on the price of foreign ex-
change, the constants A and B are determined by the requirement that the exchange rate is
insensitive to its fundamentals at the lower bound. This is required to preclude arbitrage op-
portunities as the exchange rate can move in one direction only once it notes at s. Hence, while
s′(m− K) ≥ 0 for s > s, the boundary condition s′(m− K) = 0 implies B > 0.19 With A equal
zero and B being positive, equation (10) describes the exchange rate as a non-linear function of
K, whereby it is more sensitive to changes in K the further away from the lower bound s it notes.
At the lower bound, the expected change of s is positive, and because expected depreciation
enters the basic exchange rate equation, this affects the exchange rate itself. The relationship
between K and s must be bent as s approaches its lower bound.
18λ1 and λ2 are the roots of the quadric equation in λ, λ2γσ2/2 + λγµ − 1 = 0, and are given by
λ1 =
−µ+
√
µ2+2σ2/γ
σ2
> 0, and λ2 =
−µ−
√
µ2+2σ2/γ
σ2
< 0.
19 A and B are determined by the requirement that the exchange rate function be tangent to its upper and lower
bound: In the case of a one-sided target zone, there is no upper bound on the fundamental (m− κ), i.e., (m− κ)→
∞. This implies A → 0. B then is determined by s′(m− κ) = 0, i.e. 0 = 1 + λ2B exp(λ2(m− κ)). With λ2 < 0,
this implies B > 0. Further, to preclude arbitrage opportunities, the exchange rate must spend no time on its
lower bound. But as concerns the assumption that central bank interventions are infinitesimal at the bounds, Flood
and Garber (1991) extend the model to allow for intra marginal discrete intervention policies; the behavior of the
exchange rate within such a modified model remains almost unchanged.
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B Currency option prices
B.1 Option prices in over-the-counter currency markets
This Section first shows how option prices are quoted in over-the-counter (OTC) currency mar-
kets. Then, the Section proceeds to introduce three option portfolios that are frequently traded
in these markets: at-the-money straddles, risk-reversals, and strangles summarize the position
and the shape of the density function that option prices imply for the future exchange rate.
B.1.1 Pricing conventions
For our analysis, we download daily currency option price quotes from Bloomberg for the
Swiss franc/euro exchange rate. Over-the-counter markets in which most currency option
dealing takes place use conventions based on the Black-Scholes model to express the terms and
prices of currency options.20 The Black-Scholes formula for the value of a European currency
call options is21
C(F, τ) = (FN(d1)− KN(d2)) e−rτ (11)
and the value of a put is
P(F, τ) = (F [N(d1)− 1]− K [N(d2)− 1]) e−rτ (12)
where τ is the time remaining until maturity expressed in years, F denotes the forward price
of the deliverable currency, K is the strike price of the option, r is the domestic risk-free rate of
interest, and N(·) denotes the cumulative normal distribution, and
d1 =
ln(F/K) + σ2τ/2
σ
√
τ
d2 =
ln(F/K)− σ2τ/2
σ
√
τ
20The original exposition of the Black-Scholes model is Black & Scholes (1973). A very similar model was devel-
oped independently by Merton (1976). The application of the model to foreign currency options is also called the
Garman-Kohlhagen model, after its publication by Garman & Kohlhagen (1983). (see Malz (1996), footnote 11.)
21See Garman & Kohlhagen (1983), or, for a textbook version, Hull (2012), chapter 14.
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In currency markets, the only unobserved variable in equations (11) and (12) is the volatility
of the price of the foreign currency σ. Alternatively, replacing the left-hand side of equations
(11) and (12) with an observed option price allows to extract volatility as an implicit function
of Ct or Pt, and Ft, τ, and K. In this context, σ is called the option implied volatility. The
Black-Scholes values increase monotonically in σ, so the implied volatility is a unique inverse
function of Ct(F, τ) or P(F, τ).
In over-the-counter currency markets, option quotes are made on implied volatilities rather
than option prices denominated in currency units. Also, options are not specified by strike
prices K, but by the option delta ∆ which measures the degree to which options are in- or out-
of-the-money. The delta of a put and a call is given by the derivative of the Black-Scholes option
values with respect to the forward rate
∆C =
∂C(F, τ)
∂F
= e−rτN(d1) (13)
∆P =
∂P(F, τ)
∂F
−e−rτN(−d1) (14)
Hence, the delta of an option measures the sensitivity of the option price to the forward ex-
change rate and it takes on values between 0% and 100%. The delta of an at-the-money forward
option, that is, the delta of an option of which the exercise price is set equal to the forward ex-
change rate of the same maturity as the option, is approximately 50 percent. Frequently traded
are further options with a delta of 25, whereby a 25-delta call (put) corresponds to an option
with a strike above (below) the strike of an at-the-money option.
B.1.2 Volatility smile
The Black-Scholes model would imply that all options on the same currency have the same
implied volatility, regardless of time to maturity and moneyness. However, it turns out that σ
differs across deltas and maturities for options on a given foreign currency. When regarding
implied volatilities for a specific maturity only, one typically finds that the implied volatility is
higher for options with a delta further away from 50 percent, that is, for options that are more
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deeply in-the-money or out-of-the-money. This pattern is referred to as the “volatility smile”.
Three instruments that are actively traded in over-the-counter currency option markets, delta-
neutral straddles, risk-reversals, and strangles or butterfly spreads, summarize the position and
shape of the volatility smile. Straddles and strangles both consist of buying or selling an
equal number of call and put options on the same currency with the same time to maturity.
A delta-neutral straddle consists of a portfolio in which both, the put and the call option are
at-the-money. The price of this portfolio gives the at-the-money (atm) implied volatility, and it
indicates the overall level of the volatility smile. A strangle is a portfolio of an out-of-the-money
put and an out-of-the-money call with the same delta; most frequently, strangles with a delta of
25 percent are traded. Strangle prices are quoted as the spread of the average implied volatility
at which the options are bought or sold over the at-the-money implied volatility:
str25 =
σ(C25) + σ(P25)
2
− atm
The strangle implied volatility indicates the degree of curvature of the volatility smile; hence,
a strangle is a bet on a large move of the underlying currency either upwards or downwards.
Eventually, the risk-reversal also consists of an out-of-the-money put and call, but in contrast to
the strangle, the dealer exchanges one of the options for the other with the counterpart. Because
the put and the call generally have different implied volatilities, the dealer pays or receives
a premium for exchanging the options. The premium is expressed as the implied volatility
spread at which a 25-delta call is exchanged for a 25-delta put and indicates the skewness of
the volatility smile
rr25 = σ(C25)− σ(P25)
If a 25-delta call trades at a higher price than a 25-delta put such that the risk reversal is positive,
this indicates that the market favors the foreign currency.
For our analysis, we download implied volatility quotes from Bloomberg for Swiss franc op-
tions on the euro in the form of at-the-money implied volatilities, 10- and 25-delta risk-reversals
and 10- and 25-delta strangles. Given these quotes, we obtain the implied volatility of 25-delta
put and call options as σ(C25) = atm + str25 + 12 rr25 and σ(P25) = atm + str25 − 12 rr25,
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and accordingly for 10-delta put and call options. Considering put-call parity,22 Bloomberg
hence provides us with implied volatility quotes for five levels of moneyness, namely for
∆ = {10, 25, 50, 75, 90}.
B.2 Interpolating the risk neutral distribution
To obtain the risk-neutral EUR/CHF density function, we follow the approach proposed by Malz
(1997b) and interpolate the volatility smile.23 His approach bases on the insight promoted by
Breeden & Litzenberger (1978) according to which the discounted risk-neutral density function
of the time T asset price equals the second derivative of the call option price function with
respect to the exercise price
∂2C(F, τ; K, σ, r)
∂K2
= e−rτpi(K) (15)
To obtain a closely spaced series of call option prices with different exercise prices, which is
needed to empirically implement equation (15), Malz proposes to first interpolate the volatility
smile to obtain a series of implied volatility quotes across deltas, and then to use the Black-
Scholes call option price formulas (11) and (13) to transform the option prices from the volatility-
delta space to the cash price - strike price space. With the at-the-money implied volatility (atm),
the risk reversal (rr), and the strangle (str) volatility price quotes indicating the level, the skew-
ness and the kurtosis of the volatility smile respectively, Malz (1997b) proposes to approximate
the implied volatility function by
σˆ(∆) = b0atmt + b1rrt(∆− 0.50) + b2strt(∆− 0.5)2. (16)
Imposing the condition that the at-the-money volatility and the risk-reversal and the strangle
price lie exactly on σˆ(∆) allows to solve for (b1, b2, b3) = (1,−2, 16). Since delta itself is a func-
tion of the implied volatility, one can substitute equation (13) into equation (16) and solve for σ
as a function of K. Having obtained implied volatilities for given strike prices, the call pricing
function (11) eventually allows to substitute out cash call prices for given strike prices. The last
22Put-call parity implies that puts and calls with the same exercise price have identical implied volatilities, so the
volatility of an x-delta put equals that of an (1− x)-delta call.
23The literature has presented a large number of techniques to estimate the option implied density function for
future asset prices. Jackwerth (1999) for example provides an extensive survey.
38
step to obtain the risk-neutral probability distribution of strike prices at maturity requires to
differentiate the call price function with respect to the strike prices. This is easiest done numer-
ically by calculating simple finite differences. The estimated cumulative distribution function
at point K is
Πˆ(K) = e−rτ
(
C(K)− C(K− h)
h
+ 1
)
and the estimated probability density function is
pˆi(K) =
Πˆ(K)− Πˆ(K− h)
h
where h is the step size between adjacent strike prices K. This is done for each K to draw the
entire cumulative distribution or density function.
B.3 option implied probability for EUR/CHF < 1.20
Figure 9: Option prices implied probability for EUR/CHF < 1.20 (1.10) one month in the future
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The figure plots the risk-neutral probability that the Swiss franc will note below 1.20 (1.10) to the euro
at the expiration dates of European option contracts, which lie one month in the future. The risk-neutral
density function for the Swiss franc price of the euro is obtained by interpolating the volatility smile as
suggested by Malz (1997b).
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